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PRIVATE REMEDIES TO ABATE WATER POLLUTION
IN VIRGINIA AND NEW THEORIES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
During the past decade increasing numbers of private citizens have
become interested in assuming an important role in the governmental
process. As a result of this trend many individuals who are no longer
satisfied to remain mere observers of the decision making process actively
participate in the fight to save the environment. Consequently, con-
servation groups and private individuals are more likely to challenge
administrative and legislative decisions which they believe fail to con-
sider environmental factors. This trend, effectively channelled, can do a
great deal to preserve one of Virginia's vital natural resources-its waters.
In order to aid in providing the necessary direction ths note will
analyze the private )udicial remedies in Virginia which are available to
abate water pollution. Examined in order will be: the enforcement of
common law water rights as a means of maintaining water quality;
general environmental law; and new theories and procedures which are
developing.
PRIVATE REMEDIES TO ABATE WATER POLLUTION IN VIRGINIA
Natural Surface Watercourses
Virgnua has a bountiful supply of streams and rivers, legally defined
as natural surface watercourses.1 These watercourses flow generally
westward from the Alleghenies into the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers,
and eastward to the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean.2 This
resource provides Virginians with numerous natural commercial high-
ways, vast and varied spawning grounds for fish and shellfish, and
abundant recreational facilities.
1. A stream, or water course consists of bed, banks, and water, and to main-
tain the right to a water course it must be made to appear that the water
usually flows in a certain direction, and by regular channel with banks or
gides and having a substantial existence, but it need not be shown that the
water flows continually, as it may be dry at times.
Henmger v. McGinms, 131 Va. 70, 76, 108 S.E. 671, 673 (1921), quoting from Tampa
Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896). See also W WALKER & W
Cox, WATER REsoujRcFs LAWS FOR VIRGINIA 7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WALxER &
Cox]. This work is a comprehensive study of the relevant Virginia law as of 1968.
The author has relied heavily upon this source in this section.
2. A. ErmnREY, WATEas OF Tim STATE 279 (1931).
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The importance of surface watercourses renders it necessary that they
be protected from pollution. While it is acknowledged that the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the proper utilization of the state's water-
courses must lie with state agencies, the private citizen can do a great
deal to aid these agencies in accomplishing the mutual goal.
The-use of a natural surface watercourse is governed by a form of the
riparian doctrine,' a common law system of water rights based on the
ownership of land traversed or bordered by a natural watercourse.4
Two distinct theories have developed m jurisdictions which follow the
riparian doctrine. The "natural flow" theory which originated in Eng-
lish common law is based on the principle that "water flows, and ought
to flow as it has been wont to flow" 5 According to this theory, a
riparian ownerO has a right to have a stream flow in its primeval condi-
tion undiminished and unpolluted by others The objective is to pre-
serve the natural flow A right of action accrues as soon as there is a
recognizable dimnution in the quality of a riparian's water. This right is
qualified only by the domestic or "natural" uses of fellow riparians.3
"Natural" uses are permitted without limit because they are necessary
to sustain life.9 "Artificial" uses, such as irrigation and industrial use, are
allowed only if they do not "impair the quality or quantity of the
stream's natural flow" 10
The Reasonable Use Theory
Virginia, in accord with a majority of jurisdictions, has rejected the
"natural flow" doctrine in favor of the "full beneficial" or "reasonable
3. The theory generally followed in Western states is the appropriation doctrine:
Under the doctrine of appropriation, he who is first in time is first in right,
and so long as he continues to apply the water to a beneficial use, subsequent
appropriators may not deprive him of the rights his appropriation gives,
either by diminishing the quantity or deteriorating the quality
Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 12 Ariz. 190, 202, 100 P 465, 469 (1909), aff'd, 230
U.S. 46 (1913). For a more complete examination of this doctrine, and related theories
in the Western states, see 3 B. GINDLER, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 212-13.3 (Clark
ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as GiNDLI.R].
4. WALxER & Cox, supra note 1, at 8.
5. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 439.
6. A "riparian owner" is defined as "one who owns land on the bank of a nver"
BLAcK's LAW DiCnONARY 1490 (4th ed. rev. 1969)
7. Kinyon, What Can A Riparian Proprietor Do?, 21 MINN. L. REv. 512, 522 (1937);
Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 734, 736 (1970).
8. International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W Va. 892, 893, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1944)
9. Kinyon, supra note 7, at 517 A natural use is generally domestic in character.
10. 3 GINDLER, supra note 3, 5 211.1 (A).
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-use" theory 11 The theory of "reasonable use" is that natural streams
exist primarily for the benefit of mankind. To this end, they need not
remain in their natural state.' Under the "reasonable use" rule the
rights of riparians are equal. The primary right is to be free from an
unreasonable interference with one's use. Since the sole limitation
upon use is reasonableness, a use that impairs natural water quality, but
not to such an extent as to interfere with beneficial use, is reasonable and
therefore permitted.13
1. Unintentional Invasion Under Riparian Law
If a riparian is not substantially certain that his impairment of water
quality will harm another riparian's use, his invasion is unintentional.' 4
This usually arises when the pollution occurs nfrequenly "5  Unm-
tentional interference with a riparian's use of a watercourse is reasonable
until it causes substantial harm to another riparian."- Even if substantial
harm results, absent a showing of negligence the unintentional invasion
will be considered an unavoidable accident for which liability is not
imposed.'7 Only when the polluter's conduct is negligent, recldess, or
ultrahazardous will liability attach, allowing the riparian to seek damages
or injunctive relief.'8
Nonnparian uses19 of a proprietor, as well as riparian uses, 20 are pro-
tected from invasion. Generally, however, riparian uses are pre-
11. Id. S 211M.(B). This clearly is the better rule, especially when the doctrine's
emphasis on optimum utilization of resources is considered in the context of modern
industrial development.
12. Note, supra note 7, at 736.
13. 3 GiNDLER, supra note 3, § 211.1(A); WALER & Cox, supra note i, at 13.
14. 3 GNmLER, supra note 3, § 211.2 (A).
15. See REsTATEMENT oF TORTs § 851, comment e at 356 (1939).
16. See RESATmMENT OF TORTS, Introductory Note (The Reasonable Use Theory)
to Topic 3, ch. 41 at 344 (1939). See also §§ 832, 849-51 (particularly comment f
to § 851), 858-60.
17. RESTATEAENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 8 (1965)
18. See American Cynamid Co. v. Sparto, 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959) (alternative
holding of liability based on negligence).
19. "Nonriparian uses are those made neither on nor in connection with the use of
the riparian land, and include such uses as the diversion and sale of water from the
stream for non-riparian consumption, and diversion of water for irrigation of land
outside the watershed of the watercourse or lake, although on the land of the riparian
owner:' REsTATEMENr OF TORTS § 855, comment a at 374 (1939).
20. "Riparian uses are those made on or in connection with the use of the riparian
land, and include such uses as the riparian proprietor's domestic uses on his riparian
land, irrigation of his riparian land, use for power and steam m his mill or factory -there-
oia, and the like: Id.
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ferred over nonriparian uses. Therefore, an upstream riparian use
which interferes with a downstream riparian's nonriparian use will not
result in liability This is true even if substantial harm results from the
polluter's conduct which would otherwise be considered negligent,
reckless, or ultrahazardous. 2'
A nonripanan, owning no riparian land and having no legally pro-
tected interest in the use of water, is also without remedy for harm to
his use of water caused by a riparian propnetor.2 Therefore, it appears
that a nonriparian would not be liable to another nonriparian for inter-
ference with the latter's use of a water supply
2. Intentional Invasion Under Riparian Law
In most cases a polluter knows his pollution will harm other riparians.
Therefore most litigation involves the intentional invasion of a riparian's
use of water.
As is the case with unintentional invasions, an intentional invasion
gives rise to no legal injury until substantial harm results,23 nor does any
liability arise unless the utility of the polluter's conduct is outweighed
by the gravity of harm to the riparian proprietor's use.24 Generally,
courts do not articulate the issue of reasonableness in terms of weighing
the utility of the polluter's use against the gravity of harm to a riparian's
use, but rather evaluate reasonableness in light of the total circumstances
of the case. The following factors have been emphasized in making
this determination:
The character of the watercourse, including its size and velocity;
the amount of potential pollutant compared with the volume of
the water; the location of the watercourse; the uses which can be
made of the watercourse; the general custom of the locality and all
the local uses of the watercourse; the nature of the businesses and
the uses to which the water is put by each party; the extent of the
21. 3 GiNDLR., supra note 3, § 211.2(D).
22. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 856 (1939) However, a riparian may be liable to a
nonriparian for other torts resulting from pollution. See 3 GiNDLwR, supra note 3.
23. 3 GiN LER, supra note 3, § 211.3(B).
24. See RESTATAwNT OF TORTS §§ 852-857 (1939). If the utility of the polluter's
conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm to the riparian proprietor, the interference
with the riparian's use is considered reasonable. If the factors balance evenly, liability
will be imposed on the polluter "because his conduct is unreasonable unless its utility
out'weighs the gravity of the harm to plaintiffs." 3 GiNDLER, supra note 3, § 211.3(B)
n.40.
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harm; and priority of use. The same use may be reasonable under
one set of circumstances but unreasonable under another.2
It is apparent, however, that by considering these factors the courts are
actually balancing the utility of the polluter's use against the gravity of
the harm done to the plaintiff's use. 20
As in unintentional interferences, riparian uses are given preference
over nonriparian uses.2 7 In jurisdictions which consider the character
of the use-riparian or nonriparian-as one of the factors in balancing
utility against gravity, the riparian use is preferred when all other factors
are equal.28
In other jurisdictions, the balancing procedure is not required because
riparian uses are conclusively preferred over nonriparian uses. In these
jurisdictions intentional pollution caused by a riparian's nonriparian use
which results in substantial harm to a riparian use is unreasonable per se.
Conversely, substantial harm to a riparian owner's nonriparian use
caused by a riparian use is reasonable and imposes no liability upon the
riparian user.2 9
As is the case with unintentional invasions, a riparian is not liable to a
nonriparian for intentional pollution which interferes with the non-
riparian's use of water.3 9 Similarly, a nonriparian appears to have no
remedy against another nonriparian for an intentional act of pollution
which interferes with the use of a watercourse.
Virginia's Application
Although there is language in several decisions which appears
to support the "natural flow" theory3' as well as the "reasonable use"
25. 3 GiNDIER, supra note 3, § 211.3 (B) n.41.
26. Id. § 211.3 (B).
27. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 855 (1939).
28. Id. comment b.
29. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS, § 851, comments b-e (1939).
30. REsTATEmmEr OF TORTS § 856 (1939).
31. Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 275, 9 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1940), quoting from
1 R., MiNoR, REAL PioPEm-y § 55 (2d ed. 1928).
The well settled general rule on this point is that each riparian proprietor
has ex jute naturae an equal right to the reasonable use of the water running
in a natural course through or by his land for every useful purpose to whch
.it.can be applied, whether domestic, agricultural or manufacturing, pro-
viding it continues to run, after such use, as it is 'wont to do, qithout ma-
terial diminution or alteration and unthout pollution; but he cannot diminisb
its quantity materially or exhaust it (except perhaps for domestic purposes
497 ]]
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theory, the latter has generally been applied and is the rule in Virginia
today 32
The rights of riparians are correlative.33 An upstream proprietor may
make any reasonable use of a watercourse in connection with the riparian
land "provided he leaves the current diminished by no more than is
reasonable." 34 It is not every impurity which will result in redress for
the injured riparian and, in fact, water may "be rendered unfit for many
uses for which it had before been suitable but so far as that condition
results only from reasonable use of the stream in accordance with the
common right, the lower riparian has no remedy" 35 (Emphasis sup-
plied)
The reasonableness of a use is determined in Virginia in the same
manner as in other jurisdictions. However, the necessity or importance
of a polluter's use, in a public sense, as a material element m the de-
termination of reasonableness has been rejected by a line of Virginia
cases. As stated in Arnrnzus Chemical Co v. Landrumi:37 "Neither
can the private business of one man or class of men, however important
its successful operation may be to the public or to the development of
the country, give such persons or class of persons the right to destroy
or materially injure the property of another in a thing in which they
have common rights." This reasoning implies that the courts are willing
to consider more than purely economic factors, and will prevent large
industrial concerns from claiming a right to pollute based on their eco-
nomic contribution to the community
Waters Under the Surface of the Ground: Underground Watercourses
and Percolating Ground Water
"If the underground water flows in a stream with a well defined
channel, and its existence, location, and course is " discoverable
and m the watering of cattle) to the prejudice of the lower proprietors,
unless he has acquired a right to do so by grant, prescription or license.
(Emphasis supplied.)
32. See, e.g., Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (1925);
Mumpower v. City of Bristol, 90 Va. 151, 17 S.E. 853 (1893).
33. Note, supra note 7, at 736.
34. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 467, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925),
quoting from Stratton v. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913)
35. Trevett v. Prison Ass'n. of Virginia, 98 Va. 332, 337, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900),
quoting from Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216. 219 (1872).
36. E.g., Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 176 S.E.2d 323 (1970);
Armimus Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912); Townsend v. Nor-
folk Ry & Light Co., 105 Va. 22, 52 S.E. 970 (1906). See also Smth v. Pittston Co.,
203 Va. 711, 127 S.E.2d 79 (1962); Shoffner v. Sutherland, Ill Va. 298, 68 S.E. 996 (1910)
37. 113 Va. 7, 14, 73 S.E. 459, 463 (1912)
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from surface indications, it is considered an underground watercourse.s
It is of no moment that excavation will reveal the underground water.
In order to be classified as an underground watercourse its existence
must be discoverable from surface conditions 9 The same legal prin-
ciples applied to surface watercourses are applicable to underground
watercourses.4"
If underground waters "ooze, seep, or filter, through the soil beneath
the surface, without a defined channel," they are considered percolating
waters.41 Water coming to the surface from underground water flowing
in a defined channel which is discoverable only by excavation is also
classified as percolating water.4 2 Although the presumption that under-
ground water is percolating may be overcome by proof of its existence
in a well defined channel, there do not appear to be any Virginia cases
in which this presumption has been overcome.43
Although there is little scientific validity in distinguishing under-
ground water courses from percolating water,44 a distinction is made
becauseof special legal principles applicable to percolating waters.
Two conflicting legal theories concerning percolating water have
been applied in the United States. Early American law embraced the
38. Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 447, 139 S.E. 308, 311 (1927).
39. To be discoverable from surface conditions, the appearance must only be such
as would be reasonably discoverable by "men of ordinary powers and attainments:' Id.
at 449, 139 S.E. at 311. No resort to scientific opimon is necessary. The Clincbfield
court set forth the following illustrations of the methods by which an underground
watercourse might be ascertained from surface indications.
Surface depressions extending in a line on either side of a spring of
corisiderable volume may [indicate an underground stream]. Also the ex-
istence on the surface of a line of vegetation usually found nowhere except
over water courses [may provide sufficient proof]. A stream which sinks
into the ground .. for a considerable distance and then reappears, but whose
course and direction distinctly appears on the surface, [may indicate the
existence of an underground watercourse].
Id. at 448, 139 S.E. at 312.
40. Id. at 447, 139 S.E. at 311.
41. Id. at 446, 139 SE. at 311. Virgima uses essentially the same defintion as other
jurisdictions. See W HuTcHINs, T-M CAL oRmIA LAW or WATER RiGHs 426-28 (1956);
2 WiEL, WATER RImHs u T m WEsERN STATES 1022-28 (3d ed. 1911).
42. Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927).
43. WAm R & Cox, supra note 1, at 99.
44. See Guin.E supra note 3, § 216-16.2. Traditional water law has segregated
water according to its source and different rules apply to different sources. This
ignores the fact that most water sources are inseparably connected. Since the use of
watei; rom one source can subsequently affect use from another-for example, pollution
of .one source can pollute another source-all water law should be governed by the
same rules. Clark, Groundwater Management: Law and Local Response, 6 Amiz. L.
REv. 178, 188 (1965).
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English rule of "absolute ownership" of percolating waters..4 This doc-
trine regards a landowner as the owner of everything above and below
the surface of the ground. 40 Therefore, an owner of land may use per-
colatmg water in any way he desires without incurring liability to his
neighbor.4 7 Strict adherence to this rule unjustly deprives a landowner
who suffers injury from interference with percolating waters of re-
course.4 8 "The full rigor of the absolute ownership doctrine has been
modified in many jurisdictions, particularly with respect to pollution
, and in others it has been expressly rejected.50 These junsdic-
tions have adopted the "reasonable use" rule. This rule allows a land-
owner to use percolating water to develop his land 5l but forbids as un-
reasonable those uses which maliciously cut off the water supply, waste
the water, or are unrelated to the land from which the water perco-
lates.52
Virginia has not expressly adopted either rule.8 3 Only one Virginia
45. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). A few American jurisdictions
still follow this rule. See, e.g., Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Ed-
wards v. Haeger, 180 I1. 99, 54 N.E. 176 (1899), questioned by Behrens v. Scharring-
hausen, 22 II. App. 2d 326, 161 N.E.2d 44 (1959); Buffum v. Harris, 5 R.I. 243 (1858);
Houston & T.C. Ry Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W 279 (1904).
46. Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927)
47. id. at 451-52, 139 S.E. at 313. "The English rule is based on the maxim, Culus
est solum, elus usque ad collont et ad toreros (to whomever the soil belongs, he owns
also to the sky and to the depths)." Designation of this doctrine as the "absolute
ownership" rule has been criticized. It has been contended that "[slince a landowner
has no rights against an adjoining landowner who withdraws all of the water under
his land and dries up his wells, it is inaccurate to say that he owns the percolating
water under his land. [In actuality then,] the landowner does not 'own' the percolating
water until he has reduced it to actual possession." F MALoNEY, S. PLAGER & F
BALDWIN, JR., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION § 54.2 (a) (1968).
48. See Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 549, 9 N.W 845, 848 (1881)
49. 3 GINDLER, supra note 3, § 214.2; 2 WEiL, supra note 41, at 973.
50 E.g., Katz v. Walkmshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P 663 (1902); Ballantine & Sons v.
Pub. Serv. Corp., 86 NJ.L. 331, 91 A. 95 (1914).
51. Cross, Groundwaters in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149, 151 (1952).
52. Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 452, 139 S.E. 308, 313 (1927)
53. WALKER & Cox, supra note 1, at 99. Two early cases seemed to accept the
English rule, but subsequently in Clincbfield, the court stated that it did not have to
make a choice between the two rules, and that it would consider the question de novo
if presented at a later time. Clinchfield Coal Corp v. Compton, 148 Va. 327, 453-454,
139 S.E. 308, 313 (1927); Hemnger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 108 S.E. 671 (1921);
Miller v. Black Rock Springs Improvement Co, 99 Va. 747, 40 S.E. 27 (1901)
However, a recent case leaves the question unanswered. Therein the court emphasized
the plaintiff's failure to establish the underground water as a watercourse. After xuling
that the waters were percolating, it reversed the lower court's decision in favor of the
plaintiff .without examining how liability is determined as to percolating waters. C & W
Coal Corp. v. Sayler, 200 Va. 18, 104 S.E.2d 50 (1958)
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case deals specifically with pollution of percolating water. 4 This de-
cision fails to indicate a preference for either test since the court's hold-
ing may be supported by either theory However, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has stated that negligent or malicious interference with
percolating waters will result in liability 55 Since this conflicts with the
"absolute ownership" theory, it suggests that the court is moving to-
wards acceptance of the "reasonable use" doctrine. 5 This area of Vir-
gima law is in need of clarification.
The anachronistic "absolute ownership" doctrine, which permits un-
restrained pollution of percolating and underground watercourses by a
landowner without regard for his neighbors, should be abandoned in
favor of a "reasonable use" rule. Since all sources of water are interre-
lated the courts should apply uniform rules, regardless of the source.
Virginia applies the "reasonable use" theory to surface watercourses.
Logically the theory should be extended to all underground water.
Diffused Surface Waters
Diffused surface water is "derived from falling rains and melting
snow" It retains its classification "until it reaches some well defined
channel." 57 The use of diffused surface water is governed by a common
law rule which regards surface water as a "common enemy " Land-
owners may combat the water by any measure necessary to protect
their property from damage. 8 In protecting one's property, a land-
54. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 SE.d 392 (1945).
55. Couch v. Clinchfleld Coal Corp, 148 Va. 455, 462, 139 S.E. 314, 315 (1927),
quoting from Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Miller v. Black Rock Springs
Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 755, 40 S.E. 27, 30 (1901).
56. WALKE_ & Cox, supra note 1, at 101. It should be noted that the State Water
Control law applies to "all water, on the surface and under the ground." Therefore,
anyone discharging pollutants into groundwaters is required to comply with the
State Water Control Board's standards. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3(4) (Cum. Supp.
1971).
57. Howlett v. City of S. Norfolk, 193 Va. 564, 568, 69 S.E.2d-346, 348 (1952).
58.. Third Buckingham Community v. Anderson, 178 Va. 478, 17 S.E.2d 433 (1941).
There are two other rules applied by courts in this country According to the "civil
law" rule upper proprietors have an easement of natural drainage onto the lands of
lower proprietors. The lower proprietor is prohibited from repelling or obstructing the
flow. However, the upper proprietor may not increase the natural flow. Id. at 485,
17 S.E.2d at 435. For exceptions to this rule see, e.g., Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41, 112
-S.W 173 (1908); Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 70 A. 1097 (1908).
The "reasonable use" rule, as applied to surface waters, is very similar to the rule
applicable to natural surface watercourses. The landowner may- nake reasonable use
of Ins land, even if such use interferes with the flow of surface waters and causes harm
to his neighbor. It is only when the use becomes unreasonable, in light of the particular
1971]
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owner may obstruct or hinder the flow of surface water or even turn it
back upon his neighbor's land. 9
However, in Virginia, the rule is subject to three important qualifica-
dons. First, the right to rid one's property of surface water may not be
exercised wantonly or unnecessarily This limited right to repel is sub-
ject to the maxim that one must use his property so as not to in-
fringe the rights of others. 60 Second, a landowner is prohibited from
interfering with the flow of surface water which has worn or cut a
natural channel or watercourse into the soil."' Third, a landowner is
prohibited from collecting diffused surface water in an artificial channel
and pouring it onto another's land. 62
These qualifications indicate that Virginia is approaching a "reason-
able use" theory in this area, also. 3 Therefore, while the modified
"ccommon enemy" rule is articulated in terms distinct from the "reason-
able use" theory, in operation and effect they are similar.
A landowner does not acquire the same rights to the use of diffused
surface water that a riparian acquires with respect to surface water-
courses. Any rights acquired are based on the fact that the diffused
water flows onto the landowner's property Consequently, if diffused
surface water is polluted, a landowner who subsequently seeks to utilize
such water has no action against the prior polluter because the complain-
ing landowner does not acquire any rights until the water flows onto his
land." However, this should not deter abatement, for although a land-
owner is without remedy for interference with his use of surface waters,
recourse is available under any of three methods. The polluter may
have incurred liability for trespass, or creation of a private nuisance,5
or proceedings may be initiated against him based on a public nuisance
theory,"' as will be discussed in subsequent sections.
circumstances, that liability is imposed. Note, Surface Water Law in Virgma" 44 VA.
L. REv. 135, 139 (1958).
59. Norfolk & W R. R. Co. v. Carter, 91 Va. 587, 592, 22 SE. 517, 518 (1895).
60. Third Buckingham Community v. Anderson, 179 Va. 478, 485, 17 S.E.2d
433, 436 (1941).
61. .- owlett v. City of S. Norfolk, 193 Va. 564, 69 S.E.2d 346 (1952).
62. Willston Apartments, Section F, Inc. v. Berger, 229 F Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1964).
For a more detailed examination of Virginia surface water laws see Note,, supra note 58.
63. Third Buckingham Community v. Anderson, 178 Va. 478, 485, 17 SE.2d 433,
436 (1941).
64: 3 GINDLER, supra note 3, § 215.
65. Text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
66. Text accompanying notes 100-110 infra.
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Tidal Waters
In Virginia, the classification of tidal water as "navigable" is of critical
importance because all navigable waters and the soil beneath them are
deemed to be the property of the state.67
Under English common law, all tidal waters were "navigable" by
virtue of the doctrine that "only water in which the tide ebbs and flows
may be considered navigable." 6 8 This doctrine has not been applied in
the United States because of its lack of utility in a country abounding in
large non-tidal rivers and lakes.6 Application of the common law defim-
tion of "navigability" would necessarily vest ownership of these waters
in the adjoining landowners, rather than the more desirable result that
ownership should be vested in the sovereign. Therefore, the United
States' definition of "navigable" waters has been adapted to embrace
both tidal and non-tidal waters. Waters are held to be navigable when
"they are used, or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in customary modes of travel and trade on water." 10 The
crucial inquiry, therefore, appears to be whether water is "navigable"
in an economic sense.71 This definition of "navigable" may result in a
change in ownership of non-navigable tidal waters. Ownership of these
waters might now be vested in the riparian, whereas, at common law,
ownership would have been vested in the sovereign. But since no Vir-
ginia case has dealt with this problem it may be that such non-navigable
tidal waters are still owned by the state.
The ownership of tidal waters is therefore of primary importance to
the riparian. As navigable waters are owned by the state and controlled
67. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 812, 35 S.E. 448 (1900).
68. 65 CJ.S. Navgable Waters § 4 (1966). This rule is reasonable in England because
of the topography of the country. All streams, as a rule, are not in fact navigable until
tidewater is reached. "If the tidal test is applied, the determining factor is the rise and
fall of the water under tidal influence, and not the proportion of salt water to the
fresh at the place in question; but the water must be within the influence of ordinary,
and not merely exceptional tides." Id.
69. Luscher v. Reynolds, i53 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
70. Umted States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 23 F. Supp. 83, 98, ajTd, 107
F.2d 769, 780 (4th Cir. 1939), quoting from The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1871).
71. It can probably be said that all tidewater is prima facie navigable, but the pre-
sumption is not conclusive, and a river, creek, or inlet into which, the tide flows is
not navigable unless it is adapted for public navigation. Van Cortlandt v. New York
Cent. R. R. Co., 139 Misc. 892, 250 N.Y.S. 298, rev'd onother grounds, 238 App. Div.
132, 263 N.Y.S. 842, rev'd on other grounds, 265 N.Y. 249, 192 N.E. 401 (1933).
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by statute,72 pollution of these waters is not actionable in a suit brought
by private litigants. Rather, it is for the state, as owner, to control the
uses of navigable tidal waters and to determine the extent of allowable
pollution. 73  This concept takes on added significance when the pol-
luter is acting under authority of the legislature. For example, a
municipal corporation, authorized by the legislature to discharge refuse
into navigable tidal waters, will incur no private liability, although
oyster beds are destroyed. 74 There are two exceptions to this immunity
from private suit for "authorized" polluters. Damage to property above
the mean low water mark,75 or pollution creating a private nuisance 6
is held to be actionable in a private suit.
Non-navigable tidal waters and their beds are owned by riparians.
Pollution of these waters which unreasonably interferes with the owner's
use, unlike pollution of navigable tidal waters, is actionable as a private
wrong.
Natural Lakes, Ponds and Springs
A lake is "a large inland body of water having little or no current,
which is fed by surface waters or springs, and occupies a natural depres-
sion in the earth's surface." 77 A pond is a similar body of water,
except that it is of relatively small size.7 The basic distinction between
a natural watercourse and a lake or pond, independent of size, is that
a watercourse has a natural motion or current, while in a pond or a lake
the water is substantially at rest.79
Owing to the general scarcity of lakes in Virginia there is very little
state case law dealing with their use. 0 However, an adjoining owner
on an inland fresh water lake or pond has the same rights as a riparian
72. The State Water Control Law regulates "all water, on the surface and under
the ground, wholly or partially within or bordering the state or within its jurisdic-
tion " VA. CODE AN. § 62.1-44.3(4) (Cum. Supp. 1971) The Sanitation Districts
Law of 1938 prohibits the discharge of polluting water into the waters of a sanitation
district created by law. VA. CODE ANN. S 21-218 (Repl. Vol. 1969). Another section
of the Code makes it a misdemeanor to discharge oil into the navigable tidal waters of
the state. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-195 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
73. City of Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
74. Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307, aff'd, 249 U.S. 540
(1918).
75. Id. at 16, 96 S.E. at 307
76. E.g., G. L. Webster Co. v Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939)
77. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 103 (1956).
78. Id.
79, Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
80. WALXER & Cox, supra note 1, at 118.
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proprietor on a natural surface watercourse.8' Although there are no
cases dealing with pollution of lakes of ponds, since riparian principles
are applicable, an adjoining landowner would be required to meet the
same standards of reasonable use as a proprietor on a natural water-
course.
82
The use of spring water depends on the nature of the source of the
spring and upon the downstream flow For example, if the source of
of the spring (upstream flow) is a surface or underground watercourse,
the rules applied to natural watercourses are applicable. Therefore, an
owner through whose land the source flows is entitled to a reasonable
use of the water on his land. 3 Although there are no Virginia cases
in which pollution of a watercourse has resulted in injury to the owner
of a spring, it may be assumed that the question of reasonableness will
be determined in the same manner as all natural watercourses.84
Where the upstream flow is in the nature of percolating water, the
right of the upstream owner to appropriate such water is not clear.8 5
Although no cases have involved pollution, an analogy may be drawn
to cases in which springs have been completely destroyed rather than
polluted. It has been established that a reasonable, legitimate use of
property which destroys an adjoining landowner's spring supplied by
percolating water produces no liability 86 Therefore it appears that if
81. Providence Forge Fishing and Hunting Club v. Miller Mfs. Co, 117 Va. 129, 131,
83 S.E. 1047, 1048 (1915). There is a distinction between a lake or pond and the
Great Lakes, the latter being regarded as inland seas, which are within the jurisdiction
of the United States Government. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 443 (1851). Other lakes of great size are owned by the states bordering on
them, and therefore riparian rights are applicable. Musgrove v. Cicco, 96 N.H. 141,
71 A.2d 495 (1950). Since Virginia has no lakes of this size, these principles are not
of importance m the state.
82. See text accompanying notes 3-37 supra.
83. Miller v. Black Rock Springs Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 40 S.E. 27 (1901).
84. See text accompanying notes 3-37 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 38-56 supra.
86. VALKER & Cox, supra note 1, at 120. This rule has been established in a group
of cases',dealing with the destruction of springs by nuing operations. C & W Coal
Corp. v. Salyer, 200 Va. 18, 104 S.E.2d 50 (1958); Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v.
Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 S.E.2d 392 (1945); Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 149
Va. 455, 139 S.E. 314 (1927); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 SY_.
308 (1927).
The Supreme Court of Virginia has also indicated that one mining coal beneath land
owned by- another will incur liability if a spring is harmed as a result of failure to
properly support the surface. No liability will be unposed if the support was sufficient.
Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 8.9 S.E. 305 (1916).
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a spring is polluted as a result of an "unreasonable" 87 use, the spring
owner will have a judicially enforceable remedy
The right of the spring owner to make use of the spring's water is
also determined according to the type of downstream flow As the
downstream flow may occur as a watercourse, diffused surface water,
or percolating water, the owner's right of use will vary according to the
legal principles applicable to each of the three possible situations.88
Artificial Ponds, Reservoirs and Channels
Although no Virginia case deals with pollution of artificially confined
waters, prediction of how a court might analyze such a problem can be
made with some certainty Where waters are artificially impounded in
ponds and reservoirs, the impounder's use will be determined by refer-
ence to the source of the impounded waters.89 For example, if the source
of a reservoir is a river, then rights acquired by the impounder are gov-
erned by the law of natural watercourses. An impounder's use must be
reasonable. His rights are subject to the reasonable use of fellow riparian
owners on the reservoir and on the river feeding the reservoir 90 How-
ever, if the source of the inpounded water is diffused surface water, in
which no right of use may be acquired, the rule of reasonableness does
not apply The impounder of such water does not mcur liability for pol-
lution unless it interferes with the use of another's landY'
The rights of owners of land bordering on artificial channels arise
differently from the rights of riparian proprietors on natural water-
courses. A riverfront owner's rights arise naturally-by the mere fact
that a river cuts through or borders his property-but an artificial
channel landowner's rights arise only by grant or prescriptionY2  The
latter owner, apart from a grant or prescription which gives rise to a
right to use the water, is not legally injured if the channel water which
passes through his land is polluted. An exception to this rule exists in
87. The courts have not referred to an "unreasonable" use when imposing liability.
Instead, they have stated that liability results because the interference is due to
malice or negligence. Miller v. Black Rock Spring Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 40 SE.
27 (1901).
88. WALKER & Cox, supra note 1, at 120.
89. Id. at 122.
90. 93 CJ.S. Waters § 145 (1956).
91. Text accompanying notes 94-99 infra. VA. CoDE ANN. § 62.1-105 (Repl. Vol.
1969). As to the principles which will be applied where the source is percolating
water, see text accompanying notes 38-56 supra.
92. Kirk v. Hoge, 123 Va. 519, 523, 97 S.E. 116, 120 (1918)
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situations where the pollution interferes with the use of the land; in
this instance, an owner may seek redress based on trespass or nuisanceP3
Interference With Land
_Although the primary focus of this note is directed toward inter-
ference with the use of water, it is worthwhile to examine briefly pol-
lution which interferes with the use of land. Remedies for this inter-
ference in some cases may provide means to abate pollution of Vir-
gima waters.
Foreign materials in a watercourse9 4 which interfere with an individ-
uaFs use of his land may give rise to two separate causes of action, one
based on trespass and the other on private nuisance. Every landowner
is entitled to the exclusive and peaceful enjoyment of his landV5 If pol-
lutants which are discharged into a watercourse wash onto a land-
owner's property, the landowner may seek redress against the polluter
for trespass. 8 An intentional act of pollution is actionable as a trespass
if it consists of physical invasion, regardless of whether any harm is
caused '17 A trespass action may be initiated as soon as the polluted ma-
terial has washed ashore.
A similar discharge, although not washed onto a landowner's prop-
erty, may cause odors which are so offensive and disagreeable as to
cause a private nuisance 8 When this occurs the land owner may also
seek redress for interference with the private use and enjoyment of
his land. However, he may not bring an action for private nuisance
until the pollution is unreasonable under all circumstances. To be ac-
tionable, the pollution must substantially harm the landowner.99 Con-
sequently, if the pollutants do not actually wash onto the land, the land-
93. Text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
94. The discussion of interference with land has been limited to watercourses be-
cause such waters are most likely to give rise to this type of problem. However,
similar problems may arise in relation to other waters. 3 GuiDLam, supra note 3, § 210.3.
95. Tate v. Ogg, 170 Va. 95, 195 S.E. 496 (1938). This case does not involve pollutants
which have washed onto another's land, but it does indicate that Virginia follows the
general rule that every person is entitled to redress if the exclusive and peaceful en-
joyment of his land is wrongfully interrupted.
96. Blue Ridge Poultry and Egg Co. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 176 S.E.2d 323 (1970).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158, 163 (1965). In most water pollution
suits the polluter's repetitious conduct will be considered intentional. It will be ex-
tremely difficult for him to prove that he was unaware of the harmful nature of his
actions.
98. G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1- S.E.2d 305 (1939).
99. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822, 826, 832 (1939).
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owner has no recourse until the offensive aroma is so great as to sub-
stantially harm the use and enjoyment of his land.
Public Nuisance
Interferences with the use of water and land may be of such magni-
tude as to injure more than a few individual landowners. Water pollu-
non may threaten the general public. If this occurs, the private citizen
faces greater obstacles in protecting the public interest than if he were
merely protecting himself.
A public nuisance is defined in Virginia as "any act, omission, or use
of property which is of itself hurtful to health, tranquility, or morals, or
outrages the decency of a community" 100 The distinction between a
public and a private nuisance is that a public nuisance results in danger
to the public, while a private nuisance involves harm only to an indi-
vidual. 101 The importance of this distinction is that redress for a public
nuisance generally may be sought only by a public official. 0 2 In order
for a private citizen to enjoin a public nuisance, he must show that he
has suffered, or will suffer, special damages. This damage must be
different in kind, not merely in degree, from that sustained by the
general public. 0 3
The necessity of distinguishing the injury suffered by the individual
from that incurred by the public may be critical. If the private citizen
is unable to show his special damage, he is forced to petition a public
official, who may be reluctant to initiate action against the polluter.:""
Even if the responsible government agency is disposed to act, it may be
unable to take meaningful action due to the bulk of its workload, the
inadequate size of its work force, or a previously committed budget.10 5
Title 48 of the Virginia Code is a potential solution to this prob-
lem. This Title provides that when five or more citizens make a com-
plaint to a circuit or county court, setting forth the existence of a
public nuisance, the court shall summon a special grand jury to investi-
100. E.g., Ritholz v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 339, 350, 35 SZE.2d 210, 214 (1945)
101. 14 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENcE Nuisances § 5 (1951)
102. See Curry v. Boone Timber Co., 87 W Va. 429, 105 SE. 263 (1920); Davis
-v. Spragg, 72 W Va. 672, 79 SE. 652 (1913). See also Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 62 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1933)
108. E.g., Payne v Godwin, 147 Va. 1019, 133 S.E. 481 (1926).
104. Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part
1: State Pollution Control Program, 52 IowA L. REv. 186, 198 (1966).
105. Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving
Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1109 (1970)
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gate the complaint. 10 If the grand jury is satisfied that a public nuisance
exists, it has authority to make a presentment against the person or per-
sons causing such nuisance.10 7 If the party against whom the present-
ment is brought is found guilty, the nuisance must be abated. In addi-
non, the violator is subject to a fine not greater than $5,000.1 8
While tins Title gives the private citizen an alternative to complete
dependence on admimstrative action, a recent Michigan statute projects
this idea further. In Michigan, private citizens may bring suit on behalf
of the public in order to challenge conduct allegedly having an adverse
effect on the environment.0 9 Private citizens have direct access to the
courts in order to protect the public interest in a clean environment.
It would appear that new legislation in Virginia, based upon the
Michigan prototype, would serve as an effective weapon in environmen-
tal suits. Such legislation would eliminate restrictive standing require-
ments and encourage citizens to challenge industrial polluters." 0
Remedies
An injured plaintiff, in a water pollution suit, has two remedies: an
action at law for damages or a suit in equity for injunctive relief. In
order to maintain an action for damages, he must prove that he has
suffered substantial actual injury " Proof of threatened damage will be
sufficient to obtain injunctive relief." 2 For the plaintiff who is concerned
with more than purely economic recovery, injunctive relief is the prefer-
able remedy The availability of this remedy depends on the particular
circumstances of each case.ilS In order to gain injunctive relief, a plain-
tiff must establish that he has no adequate remedy at law '" The con-
tinuous or recurring nature of water pollution forces a court to esti-
mate plaintiff's future damage. In many cases this estimate cannot be
106. VA. CoDE AaN. S 48-1 (Rep1. Vol. 1969).
107. Id. § 48-2.
108. Id. § 48-5.
109. MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 (Cum. Supp. 1971) Similar statutes have
been considered m New York, Massachusetts, Colorado, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ElvMRONMENT: A SnuTATY FOR CrizF_ Ac'noN 247-48
(1971); Note, Legal Methods for Control of Air Pollution in New York State: An
Evaluation, 34 ALBANY L. RFv. 563, 565 (1970). N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
110. See text accompanying notes 216-45 infra.
111. E.g., Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover,, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (i925).
112. E.g., Town of Purcellville v..Ports, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
113. WALxER & Cox, supra note 1, at 132.
114. Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 8, 144 S.E. 492, 494 (1928).
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made accurately so that the remedy at law will be "inadequate." "' In
addition, it should be recognized that damages will often be inadequate
as a remedy because the polluter may continue his trespass while paying
damages, and thereby obtain an easement over the plaintiff's land.""
Even if the plaintiff is able to clear this initial obstacle, injunctive
relief may be denied where the court determines that the harm which
an injunction would inflict on the defendant is greater than the resulting
benefit to the plaintiff.117 "Balancing of the equities"-weighing the
harm that will be suffered by the defendant against the benefit received
by the plaintiff-has been characterized by many legal writers as the
single greatest obstacle to the effectiveness of private remedies as a
means to control pollution.118 A court, though recognizing that the
defendant's activities will injure the plaintiff, may, by "balancing,"
deny injunctive relief, thus leaving the plaintiff to seek his remedies at
law 119
A factor emphasized by some courts in this balancing test is the
benefit to the public of the defendant's business. 20 But, in emphasizing
purely economic benefits to the community, courts underestimate the
environmental harm to the community as a whole. As previously
noted, the Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that this theory
amounts to a judicial license for strong financial and industrial interests
to invade the rights of their neighbors. 121 In a 1970 opinion, the court
articulated an oft-stated principle: "The doctrine of balancing the
equities must be viewed in light of our long-standing pronouncement
that a private landowner is to be protected for injuries he may sustain
even though inflicted by forces which constitute factors in our material
115. As a general rule "all damages must be recovered in one action when the act
causing the injury is permanent and at once productive of all the damage which can
ever result from it [In] cases of doubt concerning the permanency of the injury,
the right to bring successive actions has been upheld." WALCER & Cox, supra note 1,
at 132.
116. Note, supra note 7, at 738.
117. Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 8, 144 S.E. 492, 494 (1928)
118. See, e.g., Comment, Envnronmental Law: New Legal Concepts m the Am-
pollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REv. 78 (1971); Comment, supra note 105.
119. For a classic example of a court utilizing this technique in a case invoh-ing emis-
-sion of dust and raw materials from blasting operations see, Boomer v Atlantic Cement
Co, 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d.480, 294
N.Y.S.2d 452 (1968).
120. Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 9, 144 S.E. 492, 494 (1928). When
courts evaluate public benefit in purely economic terms, they seem to overlook the
public interest in a clean environment.
121. See Note, supra note 7, at 747
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development and growth." 122 This enlightened judicial reasoning sup-
ports a litigant confronting a large industrial concern which asserts the
beneficial results of its operation.
Another burden the plaintiff faces is proving proximate cause. For
example, a stream often receives effluents from many sources, no one
of which is sufficient to cause the alleged damage.12 Where there is no
concerted action, common purpose, or design on the part of the pol-
luters, but rather several concurring causes, "the effects of which are
separable, due to independent authors, neither being sufficient to produce
the entire loss, then each of the several parties concerned is liable only
for the injuries due to his negligence." 14 Because there is no joint
wrong, the polluters may not be joined in a single action. The plaintiff
is then faced with the herculean task of proving the extent to which
each polluter has contributed to the aggregate result."'*
A minority of jurisdictions confront this problem squarely A plain-
tiff may join concurrent polluters who may be held jointly and sev-
erally liable. The burden of apportionment is assigned to the defend-
ants.12 Other jurisdictions reach this result where it can be shown
that the individual polluters kmew or should have known that the
cumulative effect of their separate acts would harm the plaintiff. 27
Another frequent difficulty is the courts' inability to deal effectively
122. Blue Ridge Poultry and Egg Co. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 144, 176 S.E.2d 323, 327
(1970), quoting from Townsend v. Norfolk Ry. Co., 105 Va. 22, 49, 52 S.E. 970, 979,
(1906).
123. Hines, supra note 104.
124. Pulaski Anthracite Coal Co. v. Gibboney Sand Bar Co, 110 Va. 444, 448, 66
S.E. 73, 74 (1909).
125. Id.
126. Landers v. E. Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 252, 248 S.W.2d
731, 734 (1952); see Taylor, Control of Stream Pollution, 33 TEx. L. REv. 370, 373
(1955).
127. See Walters v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co, 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922); Northup
v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 P. 266 (1918).
Virginia has not adopted either new approach. A plaintiff has the burden of appor-
tiomng the damage among the polluters. E.g., Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758,
40 S.E.2d, 298 (1946). However, the State is not faced with this difficulty when at-
tempting to enforce its standards. The State Water Control Law defines pollution as:
An alteration of the physical, chemical, or biological property of State
waters, or a discharge or deposit of sewage, industrial wastes or other
wastes to State waters by any owner -which by itself is not sufficient to
cause pollution, but which, in combination with such alteration of or dis-
charge or deposit to State waters by other owners is sufficient to causepollution.VA. CoE Alim. $ 62.1-443(6) (c) (i) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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with scientifically complex problems. 2 8 Courts often fail to understand
the hydrologic cycle and the intimate relationship between varied
sources of water. "[C]hemical, biological, physiological, and other
scientific evidence required to prove the causal connection between the
alleged polluter's discharge and the plaintiff's harm is often highly
technical, and next to impossible for [a] judge or layman to assimilate
and evaluate." '29 A solution adopted by several jurisdictions consists
of the use of special masters who report their findings to the court.'-"
However, there is little evidence that this procedure is being utilized.'
Defenses
An injured plaintiff may be thwarted in his attempt to obtain
relief by the defenses available to a polluter. The defenses presented
below are not exhaustive, but are those most often asserted in pollution
cases.
The oldest defense used in pollution suits is the "coming to the
nuisance" rule, which provides that one who knowingly comes to an
area where a nuisance has long existed must suffer the consequences. 32
According to this rule, one who acquires riparian rights along a pol-
luted stream cannot maintain an action for interference with his riparian
uses if he was previously aware of the pollution. However, there is
a trend to disregard this antiquated rule; Virginia rejected it early, in a
case involving stream pollution. 33
The polluter may also defend on the grounds that he has acquired a
prescriptive right to pollute.'- This defense is available when the pol-
lution has existed openly, for a continuous period of time"35-twenty
years in Virginia.136 The plaintiff may overcome this defense where
the pollution has been variable, because in order to maintain the de-
fense of prescriptive right, the pollution must have been not only con-
128. Hines, supra note 104, at 199.
129. Id.
130. O'Connell, loewa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating
Existmg Uses of Water, 47 IowA L. REv. 549, 573 (1962).
131. Hoar & Gordon, Riparan Water Rights vs. A Prior Appropriation System:
A Comparison, 38 B.U.. REv. 207, 250 nA6 (1958).
132. E.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 523, 246 P.2d
554, 562-63 (1952).
133. Va. Hot Springs Co. v. Grose, 106 Va. 476, 56 SE. 222 (1907).
134. E.g., Anneberg v. Kurtz, 197 Ga. 188, 28 S.E.2d 769 (1944). See 39 AM. Ju.
Nuisances § 202 (1942).
135. Note, supra note 7, at 738.
136. Skipwith v. Albemarle Soapstone Co., 185 F 15 (4th Cir. 1911)
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tinuous, but also must not have varied in quantity or quality.18 7 It
should be noted that this defense is not available in all jurisdictions.'2
A minority of jurisdictions adopt the view that prescription is no de-
fense to an action to abate a nuisance.iS 9 This is the better rule because
of the unreasonableness in recognizing conduct as harmful, and yet
permitting it because of its longevity
Although a polluter may successfully defend against a private party
on -the grounds of a prescriptive right, this defense cannot be asserted
against the state. A state's control of its waters is not affected by any
past discharge of sewage, industrial wastes, or other pollutants.140
The holder of a water right may grant an easement by which another
person may cause what would otherwise be unreasonable pollution of
the grantor's water supply 141 An easement, like a prescriptive right,
cannot be asserted as a defense against the state in an abatement
action. 42
A defendant in a water pollution suit may allege plaintiff's own con-
tribution to the pollution in an attempt to avoid liability While the
defense of contributory pollution will not bar recovery, it will limit the
defendant's liability to an amount apportioned according to his share
of the pollution. However, unless a plaintiff provides sufficient evi-
dence to allow a court to apportion the damages, all recovery will be
denied. 143
A plaintiff whose water rights have been injured has a duty to mitigate
the damages through the exercise of ordinary care.'4 He must take
such reasonable precautions as are necessary to prevent increased in-
jury If he fails to do so, the defendant will not be held responsible for
137. Note, supra note 7, at 738. However, a seasonal use, if it is exercised according
to the use's nature, may qualify as "continuous." Anneberg v. Kurtz, 197 Ga. 188,
28 S.E.2d 769 (1944).
138. Aubele v. A.B. Galetovich, Inc, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 165 N.E.2d 683 (Ct. App.
1960); Eakens v. Garrison, 278 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1955).
139. Eakens v. Garrison, 278 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1955).
140. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. S 62.1-44.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
(1) No right to continue existing quality degradation in any State water
shall exist nor-shall such right be or be deemed to have been acquired by
virtue of past or future discharge of sewage, industrial wastes or other
.wastes or other Action by any owner. The right and control of the State in
and over all State waters is hereby expressly reserved and reaffirmed.
141. See Kirk v. Hoge, 123 Va. 519, 97 S.E. 116 (1918).
142. VA. CoDE ANN. § 62.1-44.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
143. Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946).
144. WALxR & Cox, supra note 1, at 134.
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any resulting harm. The burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed
to exercise reasonable care is upon the defendant. 145
NEW THEORIES AND PROCEDURES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Public Trust
The public trust doctrine is an ancient legal principle which has been
rejuvenated to deal with environmental problems. Simply presented,
the doctrine states that certain resources are held in trust by the govern-
ment for the public benefit. 14" The government is the "guardian of
those valuable natural resources which are not capable of self-regenera-
non and for which substitutes cannot be made by men." i47
The idea that land may exist as a public resource first developed
under the Roman legal system, and although there is no evidence that
this public right of ownership was ever asserted against the gov-
ernment, the development of the idea that property may be publicly
as well as privately owned was a significant contribution to the public
trust doctrine. 148 Under the English common law, ownership of the
lands and waters of the kingdom was vested in the King who could
dispose of them at his pleasure. However, his obligations as sovereign
included the duty to use the lands and waters for governmental pur-
poses, that is, the public interest. 49 The King's dual role resulted in his
ownership rights being divided into two categories. His private rights,
or proprietary interests, were classified as the jus przvatum. His gov-
ernmental duties, which included protection of the public's interest,
were classified as the jus publicum. Where rivers, tidal waters, or their
beds were concerned, this interest included the public's right of navi-
gation, travel, and fishing.150 The King, as a personal proprietor, could
convey his proprietary interest, the jus prvatum. However, since the
public's interest, the jus publicum, could never be alienated, a grantee
from the King always took subject to this interest.' -
Early American law reflects the Roman and English practice of pro-
145. Armimus Chem. Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 SE. 459 (1912)
146. J. Pearson, Environmental Rights and Virginia's Public Trust Doctrine, May
18, 1970 (unpublished article on file with the Wm. & MARY L. REv.).
147. Cohen, The Constitunon, The Public Trust Doctrine, and The Enmromnem,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 388.
148. Pearson, supra note 146, at 1-2.
149. Id.
150. id.
151. Id.
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tecting -certain public uses.112 The classic American case of the appli-
cation of trust principles is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.'53 The
case involved a grant to the Illinois Railroad of all the land underlying
Lake Michigan for a distance of one mile out from the shoreline and
extending one mile in length. Four years later the state legislature
brought an action to have the original grant declared invalid. The Court;
while declaring the original grant invalid, ruled that a state may not
irrevocably relinquish its authority over an area in which it has the re-
sponsibility to exercise its police power. To grant essentially the en-
tire waterfront of a major city to a private company was, in effect, to
abdicate legislative authority over navigation. 15 The Court asserted that
states have special regulatory obligations over shorelands so that title to
the navigable water of Lake Michigan is "different in character from
that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. . . It is .
held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the naviga-
tion of waters, carry on commerce over them, and have the liberty of
fishing therein free from the obstruction or interference of private
parties." 1h55 Tis decision has established what has been termed a "model
for judicial skepticism," meaning that whenever a "state holds a resource
which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will
look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties." 15
According to the Illinois Central position, a state holds the lands
under navigable waters in trust for the public purposes of navigation,
commerce, and fishing. Abdication of control over a large tract of the
land under a given body of water violates this trust, however, lesser
conveyances may not violate it. A court must determine, on a case by
case basis, whether a given alienation infringes upon the jus publicum.157
Prior to Illinois Central, Virgima courts adhered to the.rigid rule that
the -state could never alienate trust property 158 Thereafter, the courts
-152. E.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 265 (1842); Nedtweg v. Wallace,
237 Mich. 14, 20-21, 208 N.W 51, 54, aff'd on rehearing, 237 Mich. 37, 211 N.W 647
(1927),
15. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
154. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective judicial
lntervention, 68 MicH. L. Rxv. 471 (1970).
155. 146 U.S. at 457.
,,156, Sax, supra note 154, at 490-91.
.157. Pearsor ,'supra note 146, at 6.
158., E:g., .Norfolk City v. Cooke, 68'Va. (27- Gratt.) 430, 433 (1876); McCready v.
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began to develop principles more in line with the original common law
concept that a state may transfer trust land, subject to certain public
rights.159
The main body of Virgina's trust doctrine was formulated between
1916 and 1932. In City of Hampton v. Watson 6 ° the court accepted
the llinots Central rule that trust land is alienable so long as trust pur-
poses are not compromised.' 1- However, the court further enunciated
the important principle that the rights included in the jus publicum may
change with the needs of the public.
In Hampton, a lessee of oyster beds from the state brought an action
of trespass on the case against the City of Hampton to recover damages
for its alleged unlawful pollution of the waters of Hampton Creek.1 2
The court, in denying relief to the plantiff, reasoned that since the state
holds its tidal waters for the benefit of all the public, it may use these
waters for furthenng the public good. 63 The court asserted that the
state guards the health of its people for the benefit and protection of the
public at large and under present sanitary standards, sewerage systems
for all thicdy settled communities have become an imperative necessity,
a public right, which is superior to the leasing by the State of a few
acres of oyster land.'"
In effect, the court said that the plaintiff's interest was subject to the
public's interest, the jus publicum, which included protection of the
public health through sewage disposal. The court's elevation of sewage
disposal to an interest protected within the jus publicum indicates that
this concept is fluid, and may change with the needs of the public.165
Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 985, aff'd, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Mead v. Haynes, 24
Va. (3 Rand.) 33, 36 (1824).
159. Pearson, supra note 146, at 11.
160. 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
161. This position had been accepted in an earlier Virginia case. Richardson v.
United States, 100 F 714 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1900).
162. 119 Va. at 96, 89 S.E. at 81. The Pure Food and Dairy Department of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia had notified the plaintiff that he would not be permitted to sell
his oysters without first transplanting them to unpolluted waters. Id. at 97, 89 S.E. at 81.
163. Id. at 100, 89 S.E. at 82.
164. Id. at 101-02, 89 S.E. at 82. This reasoning was affirmed eight years later.
James & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp, 138 Va. 461, 122 S.E.
344 (1924).
165. Pearson, supra note 146, at 12. The court supported its ruling by quoting from
a New Jersey opinion which stated that, "the history of sewers shows that from tune
immemorial the right to connect them [sewers] with navigable streams has been
regarded as part of the ius publicum and whenever tidal streams can convemently
be reached, they have been employed as the medium of discharge to the sea." 119 Va.
at 101, 89 S.E. at-82, -quoting from -City of Newark v. Sayre, 60 N.J. Eq. 361, '45 A.
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Such an:mterpretaton supports the argument that the absolute necessity
of protecting our environment requires that environmental rights be
protected as part of the gus publicum, as will be discussed below.
It must be remembered that in Hampton the plaintiff was a lessee
who did not claim absolute ownership of the beds in issue. In previous
decisions involving claims of absolute ownership, the supreme court
had been unwilling to deviate from its pre-Illinois Central position that
the state could not grant trust property 166 Any doubt concerning the
state's ability to grant trust property was dispelled by two subsequent
decisions.
In James River & Kaawhba Power Co v. Old Domrnon Iron & Steel
Corp.,167 the court, in referring to the ownership of certain beds of the
James River, observed that
there are certain public uses of navigable waters which the State
does not [sic] hold in trust for all the public, and of which the
State cannot deprive them, such as the right of navigation, but,
subject to these public rights, there is no reason why the beds of
navigable streams may not be granted unless restrained by the
Constitution.:'s
The court further remarked that the legislature holds the power of dis-
position of state property subject only to the public's right in such
land. 69 These statements are mere dictum, however, for the court felt
bound to follow a previous decision upholding the inalienability of
trust land.170 The court reasoned that to overturn precedent would
result in confusion and possibly prove catastrophic to investments made
in reliance upon it.171
985 (1900). Arguably, this indicates that sewage disposal has always been part of the
3us publicum in Virginia. If so, the ruling in Hampton would not support the con-
tention that the interests protected by the ius publicum may change. However, the
court's language indicates otherwise. By emphasizing that under present sanitary
standards, sewage systems bave become a necessity and a public right the court indicated
that it was reacting to a new problem and protecting an interest heretofore unpro-
tected.
166. Pearson, supra note 146, at 13. See, e.g., Old Dommon Iron & Nail- Co. v.
Chesapeake & Oluo Ry., 116 Va. 166, 81 SE. 108 (1914), dismissed for want of 1ursdic-
tnon, 242 U.S. 623 (1916).
:167 138 Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924).
168. Id. at 469, 122 S.E. at 346.
169. Id.
170. Old Dominion Iron & Nail Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry, 116 Va. 166, 81 SE.
108 (1914).
171. 138 Va. at 475, 122 SE. at 348.
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Any ambiguity which may have resulted from the dicta and the
holding in James River & Kanawba Power Co was clarified in Com-
monwealtb v. City of Newport News.7 2 The state sought to restrain
the City of Newport News from dumping untreated sewage into the
waters of Hampton Roads, pursuant to state legislationY.73 The Com-
monwealth alleged that the untreated sewage polluted the waters and
rendered shellfish taken therefrom unfit for human consumption which,
in turn, destroyed the right of fishery The state relied on the trust
theory in contending that the right of fishery was a protected interest
incident to the jus publicum. 7 4 Since this argument relied primarily on
the Illinos Central theory, the court examined that decision in detail.
The court criticized the use of the term "trust," believing it more
logical to say that the legislature lacked the power to deny the people
certain uses, such as navigation in tidal waters, because of limitations im-
posed by the people in their capacity as sovereign. -7' Limitations on
state sovereignty, the court reasoned, are derived from the United States
Constitution and the Virginia Constitution. However, of these limita-
tions, only section 175 of the old Virginia Constitution contains explicit
restrictions upon the powers of the state legislature to dispose of tidal
waters. 7 7 The court interpreted this section as applying only to private
uses. Therefore, it was held not to restrict legislative authority to allow
the use of tidal waters for public purposes. 7 s
Finding no explicit constitutional proscriptions, the court examined
the jus publicum, an inherent constitutional limitation upon state
172. 158 Va. 521, 164 SE. 689 (1932).
173. Id. at 526, 164 SE. at 689.
174. Id. at 533, 164 SE. at 692.
175. Id. at 536, 164 S.E. at 693.
176. Id. at 541, 164 SE. at 694.
177. Id. at 553, 164 SE. at 699. This section of the old Constitution provided:
The natural oyster beds, rocks and shoals, in the waters of this State shall
not be leased, rented or sold, but shall be held in trust for the benefit of
the people of this State, subject to such regulations and restrictions as the
General Assembly may prescribe, but the General Assembly may, from time
to time, define and determine such natural beds, rocks or shoals by surveys
or otherwise.
VA. CoNsT. art. XIII, 5 175. This section is now part of the revised Virginia Consttu-
tion, VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
178. 158 Va. at 554, 164 SE. at 699. The court stated that the prohibition against
leasing, renting, or selling the natural oyster beds prohibited the legislature from
alienating the state's proprietary rights therein. This, when read m conjunction with
the provision requiring that the beds, rocks, and shoals shall be held in trust for the
people, prohibited the State from authorizing a private use which would substantially
impair the public use of the natural beds. Id. at 553, 164 SE. at 699.
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pomier The court reasoned that the Virginia Constitution, by its
very purposes, denied the legislature power to inpair the jus publicunz
and the concomitant rights of the people.'10 It was held that the legis-
lature may not transfer the proprietary rights of the state, if such trans-
fer would "relinquish, surrender, alienate, destroy, or substantially
impair the exercise of the jus publicum." 181
The court then considered whether fishery was included in the JUs
publicum by comparing fishery with navigation, a right which is held
to be within the jus publicum 8 2 Navigation is part of the jus pub-
licum because it is public in nature and is intimately related to liberty, a
basic constitutional right.18 However, the right of fishery was held to
be without the gus publicum as it is unrelated to a basic constitutional
right and its exercise is essentially private, rather than public in nature."
Consequently, the legislation enabling the City of Newport News to
discharge sewage into the waters of Hampton Creek was upheld as a
valid exercise of legislative discretion.'8 5
Newport News established standards for determining which interests
are protected from state alienation. The courts will seek specific con-
sttutional language to ascertain whether a public right is protected.
Absent this language, a right may still be protected because it is part of
the gus publicum. The 1us publicum includes all rights which are public
in nature and are closely related to basic constitutional rights.'6
The revised Virginia Constitution, which became effective on July
1, 1971, contains an article which provides:
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the
use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters,
and other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the Common-
wealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources, its
public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it
shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere,
lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for
the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the
Commonwealth. 87
179. Id. at 546, 164 S.E. at 696.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 547,164 S.E. at 697
182. Id. at 549-50, 164 S.E. at 698.
183. Id. at 550, 164 S.E. at 698. See Pearson, supra note 146, at 18.
184. 158 Va. at 551, 164 S.E. at 698.
185. Id. at 556, 164 S.E. at 700.
186. Pearson, supra note 146, at 19.
187. VA. CoNsT. art. XI, § i.
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Arguably, this raises environmental rights to the constitutional level.
If so, the legislature is required to protect these rights. However, the
conservation article appears to be a general policy settlement rather than
a trust declaration, and therefore the courts may interpret it as lacking
the specificity necessary for recognition of a constitutional trust.188 If
the necessary constitutional specificity is held to be lacking, environ-
mental rights appear to qualify as incidents of the ius publicum under
the "impliedly constitutional" test established in Newport News. The
right to a clean environment is certainly fundamental, as any right be-
comes meaningless absent a livable environment. With respect to en-
vironmental rights being "public in nature," it is difficult to conceive
of anything falling more aptly into this category Whether the courts
will find either of these arguments to be persuasive is unknown.
Constitutional Right
If an argument based on the revised Virginia Constitution'8 or on the
Public Trust Doctrine proves ineffective, then the environmentalist may
turn to the Constitution of the United States as a basis for contending
that every citizen has a right to enjoy a clean and livable environment.
The fifth' 90 and fourteenth'9' amendments provide that neither the
United States nor any state shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or
property without due process of law" 192
The "due process" argument may be explained by examining state-
ments made by two Justices of the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Wolf v. Colorado stated that, "[d]ue process of law conveys
neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendious
expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because
they are basic to our free society" 193
Earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, Mr. Justice McReynolds, in discussing
the meaning of liberty guaranteed by the due process clause said:
While the court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included tlungs have been definitely stated. With-
out doubt, it denotes the right to enjoy those privileges
188. Pearson, supra note 146, at 21.
189. VA. CONST. art. XI,-§ 1.
190. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V
191. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
192. Id.
193. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursmt
-of happiness by free men.os
These statements support the contention that environmental rights are
necessarily included m the "compendious expression" of due process.
A healthy environment is "basic to our free society" and "essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 19-
An analysis of the evolution of the "privacy" doctrine also suggests
that environmental rights are secured by the due process clause. In
Gri wold v. Connecticut,96 the Court invalidated a Connecticut anti-
birth control statute because it intruded upon the marriage relationship,
which was "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees." 197
Mr, Justice Douglas' majority opinion examined previous cases m
which rights not specifically enumerated had been protected under the
umbrella of explicit guarantees. These cases suggested that the "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.' 198 He
asserted that "without [these] peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure." 19 E. F Roberts describes the "penumbra" theory
as follows:
Finding a zone of privacy protected by the Bill of Rights was no
easy task since privacy nowhere is mentioned therein Thus
it must be understood that each of the specific rights inventoried in
,the Bill of Rights may have "penumbras that help give them
194. 262 US. 390, 399 (1923).
195. Civm LMERTMS, April, 1970, at 3.
196. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
197. Id. at 485.
198. Id. at 484. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the concept
of liberty protects fundamental personal rights wich are not specified in the Bill of
Rights. He emphasized that the tunth amendment indicates that the framers believed
there are "additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
constitutional amendments." Id. at 488. Justice Harlan, also concurring, stated that the
relevant inquiry was whether the "Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." He felt the determination was not dependent on the
Bill of Rights and the unconstitutionality could be based solely on violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 500. The "penumbra" and
"due process" theories were rejected by .dissenting Justices Black and Stewart. See, id.
at 510-18, 528-30.
199. Id. at 482-83.
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life and substance." Similarly, the First Amendment guarantees of
free speech, press and religion implicitly guaranteed a further
"freedom of association" so that a state cannot demand member-
ship lists from legitimate groups. This example, moreover, also
illustrates that the First Amendment protects "the privacy" of
one's associations. The Third Amendment's clause prohibiting the
unconsented-to quartering of soldiers in any house during peace-
time reflects "another facet of privacy" As we have already
seen, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy and. so does the
Fifth Amendment when it forbids self-incrimination. Finally, the
Ninth Amendment tells us that the very act of listing certain rights
in the Bill of Rights must not be construed to deny the existence of
"others retained by the people." Privacy, therefore, is imminent
within the penumbras surrounding several Amendments and, with-
in the interstices wherein these several penumbras overlap, there
is authority for the proposition that the Bill of Rights did create
a right of marital privacy so fundamental that the statutes in-
volved herem had to be declared unconstitutional for infringing
thereupon 20
The evolving character of the "right of privacy" doctrine suggests
that due process is not a static concept. As society changes, new prob-
lems require that heretofore "unforseen rights" receive positive protec-
tion.201 Griswold presents a basis on which to formulate an argument
that there is a constitutional right to an environment fit for human
habitation. Under Justice Douglas' "penumbral" theory, it is clear that
without a livable environment all enumerated guarantees would be
"less secure." 202
A constitutional right to a clean environment was recently asserted
m a Umted States District Court.03 The Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) 2°4 brought a class action to enjoin defendant corporation from
emitting noxious sulfur compounds and other toxic substances into the
200. Paper submitted by Prof. E. F Roberts to the Conservation Foundation's Con-
ference on Law and the Environment, September, 1969.
201. See Note, Toward A Constitutionally Protected Enviromnent, 56 VA. L. REv.
458, 466 (1970).
202. Text accompanying notes 198-201 supra.
203. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., 1 E -VMoNMENTAL REP.
1640 (D. Mont. 1970)
204. EDF is a non-profit organization composed of scientists and citizens which,
through legal action, seeks to protect the environment. Note, Enviromnental Defense
Fund v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation: Enwnronment, Industry and Constitutional
Rights, 32 MoNTr. L. Rv. 161 & n.2 (1971).
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Missoula Regional Ecosystem,20 5 alleging that the emissions constituted
a violation of its members' rights, as, guaranteed by the due process
clauses of. the fifth and fourteenth amendments .2 0  The court, in con-
sidering plaintiff's constitutional contention, recognized that the right to
life, liberty, and property may not be denied without due process of
law, and, apparently relying on the "penumbra" theory, held that "a
person's health is what, in a most significant degree, sustains life." 207
The court further asserted that "each of us is constitutionally protected
in our natural state of life and health." 208 The case was dismissed,2°
however, because these constitutional protections were held applicable
only against governmental action, 210 rather than that of private parties.
Since defendant was a private corporation, its activities were not pro-
scribed by the due process clause, and hence the court's extension of due
process protection to the right to a healthy environment must be read
as dictum.
This dictum was disregarded by another district court where EDF,
and other conservation groups, sought to enjoin the Army Corps of
Engineers from constructing a dam across the Cosatot River in Ar-
kansas.2 11 Although a temporary injunction was granted on the basis of
the Corps' failure to file an adequate environmental impact statement
in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act,212 the court
rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional argument2al While admitting that
"[s]uch claims, even under our present Constitution are not fanciful
and may some day, in one way or another, obtain judicial recog-
nition," 214 the court nevertheless dismissed the claim, due to its reluct-
ance to adopt a theory which had not met with approval in the higher
courts.
2 15
205. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 1640.
206. Id. at 1641.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1642. If the action had been brought after July 10, 1970, the necessary
state action could have been found because on that date, the Montana State Board of
Health, in compliance with Montana's Clean Air Act, granted defendant-corporation
a variance from the pollution standards set by the board. Note, supra note 204, at 170.
210. Id. at 1641.
211. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army, 325 F Supp. 749,
motion for preliminary injuncuon denied, 325 F Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
212. Id. at 759.
213. Id. at 739.
214. Id.
215. Id. quoting from Spector Motor Ser., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1944). This same hesitancy resulted in denial of a constitutional, ckhim in a recent
19711, 507'
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
As this court indicates, it is doubtful that a theory of constitutionally
protected environmental rights will find acceptance absent recognition
by the Supreme Court. Whether the Court will be receptive to the
idea of a constitutional right to a clean environment must await adjudica-
tion. However, the impact of public opinion on constitutional interpre-
tation cannot be overstated. A favorable climate exists, and continued
public action should facilitate recognition of this elemental right.
Standing to Sue
If a constitutional right to an undefiled environment were recognized,
every citizen affected could assert an alleged violation of his right in
the courts. Until such right is recognized, however, determination of
who has access to the courts in order to seek redress is of the utmost
significance. In many environmental suits, the plaintiff's most difficult
burden is establishing standing to assert an alleged wrong. The question
of standing, or the right to petition a court for redress is most important
in regard to the ability of a private individual to challenge governmental
decisions adversely affecting the environment.
Control and regulation of many of our valuable resources is vested in
governmental agencies, which often appear to be aligned with the in-
terests they are charged with regulating If conservation groups or in-
terested private citizens are to be effective, they must have access to
the courts in order to challenge administrative decisions which they be-
lieve fail to consider environmental factors. 21 The standing of con-
servation groups to assert conservational, aesthetic, and recreational in-
terests is being hotly debated in the federal courts.
In 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on the
question of standing in West Virginia Highland Conservancy v. Island
Ohio case. United States v. 247.37 Acres, 3 E-VMRONMETAL RE'. Cas. 1098 (S.D. Ohio
1971).
216. In Virginia, access to the state courts is provided by the General Adinistra-
tive Agencies Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.13 (Repl. Vol. 1964). Other enactments also
provide access. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Cum. Supp. 1971). This section
provides:
(a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether
such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial review
thereof under this chapter either in the Circuit Court of the city of Rich-
mond or in any court of record having jurisdiction in the city or county
in which such person resides or in which is located the principal office of
his business, or in which is located his property affected by the decision
complained of.
[Vol. 13-477
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Creek.2 17 Therein, West Virginia Highlands Conservancy 21 sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions against the supervisor of the
Monongahela National Forest, and the Island Creek Coal Company
requiring them to halt mining and timber-cutting activities in a national
forest in order to preserve the wilderness characteristic of that area.
A district judge granted a preliminary injunction from which the de-
fendant appealed on the grounds that the Conservancy lacked standing
to bring the action. In affirming, the court of appeals discussed the
standards for standing established by the Supreme Court in Data Proc-
essing Service v. Camp 19 and Barlo'w v. Collins.220 These decisions
formulated a dual standing requirement. First, in order to challenge an
administrative decision, a plamtff must establish a "case or controversy"
within the Article III limitation of judicial power, by showing that the
challenged agency action would cause him injury 2 21 Second a plaintiff
must show that the interest in question is "within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." 222
The court in Island Creek held that the Conservancy satisfied both
elements of the test. The alleged injuries to the group's aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational values complied with the injury require-
ment of the Data Processing test.223 Furthermore, since the Conservancy
sought to protect the same interests with which the National Environ-
217. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1971).
218. Conservancy is a non-profit membership corporation dedicated to pre-
serving natural, scenic and historic areas in the West Virgima Highlands.
It has over two hundred members who reside principally in West Virginia,
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. It publishes a news letter and
sponsors field trips for the pleasure and education of visitors to the high-
lands. One of its main concerns is the protection of an 18,000 acre area
within the Monongahela National Forest known as the Otter Creek Basin.
It has prepared a detailed study of the Otter Creek drainage area, spon-
sored hikes along Otter Creek and organized meetings to discuss the future
of Otter Creek.
Id. at 233.
219. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
220. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
221. 397 U.S. at 152.
222. ld. at 153.
223. 441 F.2d at 234. Aesthetic and conservational values have been recognized in
many other cases. The court of appeals relied on three cases to support its position.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Harden, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens
Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 384 U.S. 941
(1966).
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mental Policy Act and the Wilderness Act were concerned,224 those
interests were "within the zone of interests" accorded statutory protec-
tion.
The court discussed a contrary result which was reached by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Hickel. 2 ' The Sierra
Club had been denied standing to challenge the Secretary of the In-
tenor's decision to allow commercial development of a portion of Se-
quoia National Park.226 The club, relying on its special interest in the
conservation of national parks, contended that "its interests would be
vitally affected" by the acts of the Secretary 227 The court concluded
that, absent an allegation that the plaintiff's property would be damaged;
that its orgamzation or members would be endangered; or that its status
would be threatened, it lacked the "direct interest" needed to confer
standing. 28 This decision, which has been highly criticized, will be
evaluated by comparison with other significant decisions.
In a very similar fact situation, the second circuit reached a different
result. In Citizens Committee For Hudson Valley v. Volpe,229 the
Sierra Club, the Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley, and the New
York Village of Tarrytown objected to the construction of the Hud-
son River Expressway Two of the plamtiffs-the Citizens Committee
and the Sierra Club-made no claim that the proposed project threatened
any direct personal or economic harm to them, but instead they "as-
serted the interest of the public in the natural resources, scenic beauty
and historical value of the area immediately threatened with drastic
alteration, claiming that they were aggrieved when the Corps acted
adversely to the public interest." 230
224. 441 F.2d at 234.
225. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 870 (1971).
226. Id. at 30. The Sierra Club is a non-profit membership corporation having ap-
proximately 78,000 members nationally It is interested in the conservation of national
parks and forests, especially the lands on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.
227. id. at 29.
228. Id. at 30.
229. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 91 U.S. 237 (1970). The planned construction
required dredging and filling in portions of the Hudson River, a navigable waterway
The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit authorizing the operation
pursuant to its authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401
et seq. The plaintiffs contended that the proposed construction involved both a "dike"
and a "causeway" within the meaning of § 401, which meant that the Corps was re-
quired to secure the approval of Congress and the Secretary of Transportation before
issuing the permit. The district court enjoined the project until approval was ob-
tained. The circuit court of appeals affirmed. 425 F.2d at 100.
230. Id. at 102.
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The court of appeals extended an earlier decision so as to grant
standing. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, a conser-
vation group and three New York towns were found to have stand-
ing to challenge an order of the Federal Power Commission which
granted a license to Consolidated Edison Company of New York to
construct a hydroelectric project on the Hudson River.231 The court.
relying on the judicial review provision of the Federal Power Act,232
found the plaintiffs to be injured parties because Congress intended to
protect non-economic as well as economic interests. In order to ensure
that the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational
aspects of power development will be adequately protected, "those who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such
areas, [are] included in the class of 'aggrieved' parties." 2
Although there was no corresponding review provision within the
Rivers and Harbors Act, the Volpe court granted standing based on the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a person "aggrieved
by agency action withun the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof." 234 The plaintiffs were considered "ag-
grieved" within the meaning of three relevant statutes: the Department
of Transportation Act,2 31 the Hudson River Basin Compact,"" and a
United States Army Corps of Engineers regulation.3 7 The court stated:
[Tihe public interest in environmental resources-an interest
created by statutes affecting the issuance of thus permit-is a legally
protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible repre-
sentatives of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of
231. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
232. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825.1 (b) (1970).
(b) Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order
issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such
order in the United States Court of Appeals for any circuit whereto the
licensee or public utility to which the order relites is located
233. 354 F.2d at 616.
234. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
235. Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (1970). This section of
the Act declares that "special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of
the countryside
236. Act of Sept. 26, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-605, 80 Stat. 847 The Act instructs all
agencies to consider the immense economic, natural, scenc, ustoric, and recreational
value of the Hudson River basin.
237. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1971). The regulation requires that the Corps evaluate
all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish, wild-
life, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public interest before
issuing a permit.
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agency action alleged to be in contravention of that public in-
terest.2 8
The Sierra Club court distinguished Scenc Hudson on the ground
that the statute involved in Scenic Hudson specifically granted the right
of review to an injured party, whereas in Sierra Club no such statute
was involved.23 9 But this argument failed to reconcile Volpe, in which
there was no such statute.
The Sierra Club holding adds a third element to the Supreme Court's
dual standing test. Not only must the interest in question be protected
by a statute but the same statute must confer standing. Therefore,
Sierra Club allows judicial review only upon legislative permission. The
Sierra Club court also distinguished Volpe on the factual basis that
other plaintiffs who had standing were joined in those actions whereas,
m Sierra Club, the club was the sole plaintiff.2 40 This reasoning seems
specious because the Volpe court could have separated the plaintiffs,
and denied standing to the conservation groups while permitting stand-
Ing to the other plaintiffs, and thereby reached the same result on the
merits.241 Since the court did not separate the club, it appears that the
club fulfilled the standing requirement.
Other circuits are facilitating environmental actions by liberalizing
standing requirements.242 Sierra Club, decided on questionable grounds,
is a step backwards because it restricts standing. Although the Supreme
Court has established standards for determining standing, some courts
do not understand their application.
The resulting confusion is exemplified by EDF v Hoerner-Wal-
dorf, a decision by a district court within the Sierra circut.2 43 The
plaintiff, a New York public-benefit membership corporation, was sum-
marily granted standing although it was not joined by a local concern.
The Sierra Club decision demes standing in such an instance, but the
Waldorf court failed even to mention Sierra Club.
The situation in the fourth circuit has been aptly stated by the Dis-
trict Court of Maryland. In granting standing to a West Virginia citi-
238. 425 F.2d at 105.
239. 433 F.2d at 30.
240. Id. at 33.
241. See 16 VLL. L. REv. 729, 737 (1971).
242. E.g., EDF v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); EDF v. Corps of Engineers,
325 F Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Contra, Alameda Conservation Ass'n. v. California,
437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F Supp. 878 (D.D.C.
1971).
243. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970)
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zen, a Maryland citizen, and a Pennsylvania corporation to challenge a
a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture concerning the Challis Na-
tional Forest, the court stated,
The Federal Government has been encouraging the citizens of all
the States to use and enjoy the National Parks, National Forests
and National Seashores. The Court is loath to dismiss such a
case as this for lack of standing until the Supreme Court decides
Sierra Club v. Hickel or the Fourth Circuit issues a controlling
decision.244
The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari in Sierra Club, is in
a position to clarify the confusion surrounding standing. Hopefully
it will support the trend toward liberalization.4 5
Class Actions
One of the major barriers to a plaintiff seeking redress for harm
caused by pollution is the superior financial, legal, and technical re-
sources possessed by many polluters. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ameliorates this disparity of power, by providing a
means by which members of a large group may sue as representatives
of the class without joining every member. There are four prerequi-
sites to a class action set forth in section (a)
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims and defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. 248
In addition, class actions are maintainable only if one of the condi-
tions set forth in section (b) is found to exist.
244. Honchok v. Hardin, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. GAS. 1573, 1575 (D. Md. 1971).
245. The federal water pollution legislation which passed the Senate by a vote of 82
to zero on November 2nd contains a provision which provides for citizen participation
in the enforcement of government regulations. If enacted, the bill would allow any-
one to bring a civil suit against an alleged violator of a federal or state abatement order.
Also, suit could be initiated against an EPA adnimistrator for failure to perform non-
discretionary dutes. BuIRAu Or NAnToNAL AFPAiRs, ENmoNmENTAL REPORTER, CuRRENT
DEVEI.OPmrs 789 (1971).
246..Fm. R. Civ. P 23 (a). For a more complete discussion of the rule in regard
to recent class actions involving pollution, see Annot., 7 AL.R. Fm. 907 (1971).
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The advantages of a class action are numerous. The potentially pro-
hibitive costs of suit, including obtaining experienced counsel, provid-
Ing expert witness fees, and financing technical research, can be dis-
tributed among the members of the class.247 Also, since the courts
"balance equities," 248 a class action presents the court with the true
social costs of defendant's pollution. The cost of abatement must then
be measured against the total class loss rather than the loss of one or
two plaintiffs.
The class action also has a tremendous potential for presenting, before
the public and judicial view, the critical effect of environmental degra-
dation.149 This capacity has led one commentator to describe it as "the
judicial analogue to the mass demonstrations of the streets . [whose
success] often hinges less on the ultimate outcome of the particular
case than on the publicity, visibility and aroused popular reaction it
evokes." 250
However, the effectiveness of the rule has been severely limited by
the recent Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Harris.251' Therein it
was held that when suit is brought on the basis of diversity of citizen-
sup and there is no joint or common right among the class but only
a collection of individual rights joined for convenience, the claims of
the members may not be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes. This
means that the representative, and each member of the class, must in-
dividually satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional amount 25 2 where the right
sued upon is not jointly or commonly held.253 As a result, litigants with
small claims, due to the impossibility of aggregation, will be forced to
assert their rights in state courts. State courts have been generally
unresponsive to the requests for liberalization of the class action con-
cept in environmental suits, 254 and therefore the practical effect of the
Snyder decision is to preclude redress for the small claim litigant due
to the financial impracticability of suit in state courts.
Due to the scarcity of class action suits in Virgima, it is difficult to
present the requisite standards for such a suit. However, a few re-
247. See Comment, supra note 105, at 1098.
248. Text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
249. See Comment, supra note 105, at 1098.
250. Starts, The Consuner Class Action Part 11: Considerations of Procedure,
49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 408 (1969).
251. 394 U.S. 332 (1969)
252. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
253. J. MOORE, A. VESTAL & P KURLAND, MOORE'S MANUAL § 5.12[5].
254. N. LANDAU & P RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK § 1.10(d)
(1971).
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strictions on class actions may be discerned. First, it is maintainable
only in cases in which the number of parties interested is so great, "as
to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not
within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or
where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the
death of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree." 255 The Vir-
gmia requirements are more stringent than the Rule 23 "impracticabil-
ity" test. The "difficulty" or "impossibility" of the Virginia joinder
requirement will generally preclude a plaitiff from instituting a repre-
sentative suit against a polluter.
Second, class actions are limited to suits in equty.256 This presents
a difficulty. Courts which may be reluctant to grant injunctive relief
might be willing to award damages. While the most desirable relief in
an environmental suit is abatement of pollution, the awarding of dam-
ages also has a beneficial effect. A polluter, conscious of the fact that
he may be faced with an action for damages, will be more likely to
install pollution control equipment where he knows there is a possi-
bility of an aggregate clami being initiated by a single plaintff. Since
in Virginia class action for damages is unavailable, the deterrent of an
aggregate claim is destroyed.
Quz Tam
Legal writers herald the ancient principle of qui tam as an tffective
means of abating pollution. Qui tam is an action brought by an informer
under a statute which establishes a penalty for violation of the statute.
Such a statute must provide that the informer may recover part of the
penalty in a civil action and that he may sue for himself and for the
state.2'57 An informer, after having given the government information
wich might lead to conviction of a violator against whom a fine could
be assessed, may commence the action himself should the government
fail to act within a reasonable time. 8
The writ qui tam is most often spoken of in conjunction with the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which prohibits the depositing of
refuse into a body of navigable water without a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers. The act also prohibits placing on the bank of a
255. O'Hara v. The Pittston Co., 186 Va. 325, 343, 42 S.E.2d 269, 279 (1947), quotng
fronz Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
256. See Starrs, supra note 250, at 427
257. BLAcK's LAW DianoNARY 1414 (4th ed. 1968).
258. LANDAU & RHMINGOLD, supra note 254, § 1.10(f).
19711.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
navigable waterway material that could be washed into the waterway
so as to impede navigation. 59 Violation of the act is a misdemeanor
which subjects the violator to a fine not exceeding $2,500, nor less than
$500, or imprisonment for not more than one year, nor less than 30
days, or both. Provision is also made for payment of one-half of the
fine collected to the person or persons giving information which leads
to conviction of the violator.260
Although legal writers exalt the penalty section of the Rivers and
Harbors Act as a means by which a private citizen can avoid recalci-
trant government adminstrators by bringing his own action to collect
the penalty,201 the judiciary has taken a different view Regardless of
what has been written, qui tam actions under the Rivers and Harbors
Act have proven totally ineffective because of their complete depend-
ence on statutory grant. 62 The fact that the statute entitles the informer
to share in the penalty does not necessarily give him the right to bring
an original action to recover such penalty In order for qui tam to be
available, the enactment which authorizes the penalty must also authorize
the informer to bring a civil action to collect it.2 3
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 contains no statutory authority
for a quz tain action, and in fact implicitly rules out the writ by predi-
cating recovery upon conviction of the violator. The informer's rights
are entirely dependent upon a conviction by the Department of Justice
under a criminal proceeding, and the resulting imposition of a fine. e3
A recent Congressional proposal would remedy the ineffectiveness of
the qui tam action under the Rivers and Harbors Act 25 by providing
259. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
260. Id. § 411.
261. See, e.g., LANDAU & RHEINGOLD, supra note 254 § 1.10(f); Casto, The Use of the
Corps of Engineers Permit Authority as a Tool for Defending the Enviromnent, 11
NAT. RES. J. 1 (1971); Comment, supra note 118, at 102; Note, Water Pollution Control
Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 32 MoNT. L. REv. 120, 127 (1971).
262. E.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, 324
F Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971) The most recent qui tam action in Virginia was decided
i 1970. Although a fine of $1,000 was collected from the violator, the informer was de-
med recovery because the United States Attorney based his complaint on § 412 of the
Act which imposes civil instead of criminal liability for any violation. Since an informer
is entitled to one-half of the fine under § 411 only upon conviction of the violator, the
recovery of a civil penalty nullified the informer's right to recovery Shipman v.
United States, 309 F Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1970); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F
Supp. 848 (ED. Wis. 1971).
263. Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, 324 F Supp.
302, 306 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
264. Id.
265. H.R. REP. No. 8355, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
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that if the United States Attorney fails to institute action within 60 days
of receiving information concerning a violation, the person furnishing
such information can institute a civil action to recover the penalty
The bill would increase the penalties for violation to a mimmum of
$10,000 and a maximum of $25,000. If this amendment is enacted, the
statute would become an effective means of protecting the environment
through citizen action.
CONCLUSION
The "reasonable use" rule should govern utilization of all water.
There is no scientific or legal merit in applying different rules of law
to the various sources of water.a6o This is true because the sources of
water are so intimately related that pollution of one source-for example,
diffused surface water-will affect another source, such as a stream.
Under existing law, the use of stream water must be reasonable; how-
ever, the use of diffused surface water, even though it vitally affects the
quality of stream water, is not subject to the requirement of "reason-
able use." Since application of the "reasonable use" rule is basically
a balancing procedure, the factors considered by the courts are of
critical importance. The judiciary has indicated a willingness to con-
sider non-economic factors in this balancing process. The supreme
court has asserted that regardless of the public importance of a polluter's
use, the rights of others cannot be destroyed. This forthright approach
should be extended by including the public's interest in a clean environ-
ment as a factor to be considered in the balancing process.
The prohibition against joining contributing polluters not acting in
concert is an impediment to the effective control of pollution. Virginia
should follow the minority of jurisdictions which hold concurrent
polluters jointly and severally liable while placing the burden of appor-
tionment on the polluters.
With reference to the new concepts in environmental law, it appears
that Virginia has a viable tool for environmentalists in its public trust
doctrine.267 The enactment of a conservation article in the Virginia
Constitution adds support to the argument that environmental rights
should be protected according to trust principles, and may provide a
means for challenging governmental decisions which fail to consider
environmental factors.
The recognition of a constitutional right to a clean environment and
266. WALimR & Cox, supra note 1, at 136.
267. Pearson, supra note 146, at 28.
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increased access to the courts through liberalization of standing require-
ments must await determination by authorities beyond the state level.
However, should that determination result in decisions favorable to
environmentalists, it can only be hoped that Virginia courts will not
hesitate to recognize this progress.
LESLIE J. Roos
